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The Commission lacked adequate representation from the state 
and local practitioner community, was dominated by the defense 
community, and failed to produce work products of significance 
for the forensic science community.1  The importance of the NCFS 
[was] as a ‘forensic science sandbox’ where all interested 
stakeholders and the broader scientific community can come 
together.2 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In April 2017, the National Commission on Forensic Science (NCFS or 
“the Commission”) was forced to disband as a result of Attorney General 
Jeff Sessions’s decision to not renew the Commission’s charter.  The 
 
* Professor of Law and Director of Advocacy Programs, Temple University Beasley School 
of Law.  Professor Epstein was a member of the National Commission on Forensic Science 
from its inception until its demise in April 2017. 
 1  Press Release, Nat’l Dist. Attys. Ass’n, National District Attorneys Association 
Applauds Expiration of National Commission on Forensic Science (Apr. 10, 2017), 
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20Statemen
t%20on%20Expiration%20of%20National%20Commission%20on%20Forensic%20Science
.pdf.   
 2  Betty Layne DesPortes, The National Commission on Forensic Science April 10-11, 
2017, Meeting, AM. ACAD. OF FORENSIC SCI. (Apr. 13, 2017), https://news.aafs.org/aafs-
news/the-national-commission-on-forensic-science-april-10-11-2017-meeting/.   
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NCFS’s demise raises the question: did the NCFS effect actual 
improvements in forensic science, merely redirect and change the 
conversation, or prove ineffectual?  Perhaps peculiarly in regard to a body 
that was devoted to ensuring that forensic evidence should be data-based and 
data-reported, the response to these questions will be in part anecdotal, in 
part intuitive, and in part speculative.  The over-arching conclusion will be 
“some of each”—with some actual improvements and substantial changes in 
the conversation but with significant failure or inadequacy mixed in. 
This Article will trace the NCFS from its immediate antecedent roots—
in particular, the 2009 National Academy of Sciences Report 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH 
FORWARD3 (“NAS Report” or “the Report”)—showing the Commission’s 
origin was a product of a legislative failure to enact reforms proposed by the 
National Research Council (NRC).  It will then survey the work product of 
the Commission and attempt to assess the impact of some of the “views”4 
and “recommendation”5 documents that were adopted.  This Article then 
turns to the judicial response to both the STRENGTHENING FORENSIC 
SCIENCE Report and the work of the NCFS.  It thereafter attempts to trace 
the impact of one particular aspect of NCFS work, its “human factors”6 focus 
on issues relating to cognitive bias.  This Article concludes with a limited 
attempt to predict the future, specifically in the context of the current 
Department of Justice’s intent to “advance forensic science and help combat 
the rise in violent crime.”7 
II. THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE COMMISSION AND THE BIRTH OF THE 
NCFS 
Debates may never resolve when science—or what was believed in its 
time to be science—was first used to assist in resolving a criminal 
investigation; but by one account, this occurred in roughly 1200 A.D. when 
principles were suggested to aid in the determination of whether a death 
occurred as a result of strangulation or an accidental drowning.8  Whatever 
 
 3  NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC 
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles
1/nij/grants/228091.pdf [hereinafter NAS REPORT].   
 4  See text infra note 47. 
 5  Id.   
 6  See text infra notes 115–46.   
 7  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Jeff Sessions Announces New 
Initiatives to Advance Forensic Science and Help Counter the Rise in Violent Crime (Apr. 
10, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-announces-new-
initiatives-advance-forensic-science-and-help.  
 8  This application of then-understood science to a forensic purpose was recorded in the 
book Hsi Duan Yu (The Washing Away of Wrongs), which appeared in 1248.  José R. 
Almirall & Kenneth G. Furton, The Importance of Standards in Forensic Science, 
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the start date is, it cannot be denied that by the twentieth century, police 
crime labs and crime scene investigation units became prevalent.9 
The recognition of the risk of error10 and the acknowledgment of limits 
in forensic discipline analysis and testimony in the United States came more 
slowly.  Focus came first to the issue of underfunding and the consequences 
thereof—inadequate equipment and the inability to hire qualified 
personnel.11  What came next were proficiency concerns, with a report in 
1978 concluding that “[a] wide range of proficiency levels among the 
nation’s laboratories exists, with several evidence types posing serious 
difficulties for the laboratories.”12  A subsequent review, addressing results 
of proficiency tests conducted between 1978 and 1991, concluded that 
proficiency varied significantly depending upon the discipline at issue.13 
It was under the leadership of then-Attorney General Janet Reno that 
attention was drawn to forensic error in terms of erroneous conclusions or 
scientific evidence being relied on for more than it could properly prove.14  
The Report was a post-mortem assessment of what went wrong in the first 
twenty-eight cases where individuals were convicted of crimes and 
subsequently exonerated by DNA evidence.  Regarding the use of forensic 
evidence to support what proved to be erroneous convictions, the report 
concluded that: 
 
[i]n many of the study cases, according to documentation 
examined and those interviewed, scientific experts had convinced 
juries that non-DNA analyses of blood or hair were reliable 
 
STANDARDIZATION NEWS (Phila. Apr. 1995), http://www.scafo.org/library/140502.html. 
 9  Id.  
 10  The term “error” here references when application of a forensic discipline has linked 
crime scene or other evidence to a particular individual but that association is wrong or 
without sufficient foundation to support the conclusion.   
 11  Kenneth E. Melson, Embracing the Path Forward: The Journey to Justice Continues, 
36 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 197, 199 (2010) (discussing the 1967 report “The 
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society” and the 1973 report “National Advisory Commission 
on Criminal Justice Standards & Goals—Task Force on Police”).   
 12  JOSEPH L. PETERSON ET AL., LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING RESEARCH PROGRAM 
3 (1978).   
 13  Joseph L. Peterson et al., Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing Results, 1978–1991, 
II: Resolving Questions of Common Origin, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1009, 1011 (1995).   
 14  EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, 
EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf.  Another 
concern, that of malfeasance by laboratory personnel, also became of note in the 1990s.  See, 
e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for 
Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 439 (1997).  The problem was not 
limited to the United States.  David E. Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the 
Commonwealth, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 123 (1996) (discussing cases in Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, and England).   
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enough to clearly implicate the defendants.  Scientific conclusions 
based on non-DNA analyses, however, were proven less 
discriminating and reliable than those based on DNA tests.  These 
findings point to the need for the scientific community to take into 
account the reliability of non-DNA forensic analyses vis-à-vis 
DNA testing in identifying the sources of biological evidence.15 
 
Others were not so muted.  The book CONVICTED BY JURIES included 
commentaries by “prominent experts from a variety of disciplines.”16 that 
were more explicit and pointed.  Professor Edward Imwinkelreid asserted 
that “[i]n roughly two-thirds of the cases, the triers heard testimony based on 
traditional forms of expertise, such as hair analysis—testimony that passes 
muster under the Frye standard but that, again, turned out to be erroneous.”17  
Professor Walter Rowe emphasized that “[a] second important issue is the 
number of cases in which there was misconduct on the part of the 
prosecution’s scientific experts.”18 
Yet, DNA exonerations continued apace19  So, too, did awareness of 
the risk of error and the corresponding limits of forensic disciplines.  Most 
telling in this regard was the FBI latent print debacle involving Brandon 
Mayfield.  After a March 2004 terrorist bombing in Spain, Spanish 
authorities sought the assistance of law enforcement, and in particular the 
FBI, to seek a suspect based upon fingerprints found on a bag of detonators 
found near the scene.20  A search for similar prints through the latent print 
database led to the identification of Mayfield as the bomber.  As described 
in subdued terms by the post-debacle report, 
 
[a]pproximately two weeks after Mayfield was arrested, the 
Spanish National Police (SNP) informed the FBI that it had 
identified an Algerian national as the source of the fingerprint on 
the bag.  After the FBI Laboratory examined the fingerprints of 
the Algerian, it withdrew its identification of Mayfield and he was 
released from custody.21 
 
 
 15  CONNORS ET AL., supra note 14, at 25.   
 16  Id. at iv. 
 17  Id. at xiv. 
 18  Id. at xvi. 
 19  See Exonerated: Cases by the Numbers, CNN (Dec. 4, 2013), https://www.cnn.com/2
013/12/04/justice/prisoner-exonerations-facts-innocence-project/index.html.   
 20  OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S HANDLING 
OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE 1 (Jan. 2006), https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0601/exec.
pdf.   
 21  Id.   
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The Mayfield error was of particular significance because the FBI had 
maintained that the latent print examination methodology it applied had a 
“zero” error rate.22  It also was a highly publicized error.23  The highly 
publicized error was a significant event in the lead-up to the National 
Academy of Science review of the state of forensic discipline practice and 
testimony. 
The origins of the NAS Report have been detailed elsewhere by this 
author.24  The February 2009 release confirmed several problems with 
forensic discipline evidence: 
 
 “Often there are no standard protocols governing forensic 
practice in a given discipline.”25 
 
 “[E]ven when protocols are in place[,] . . . they often are vague 
and not enforced in any meaningful way.”26 
 
 “With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis, . . . no forensic 
method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to 
consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate 
a connection between evidence and a specific individual or 
source.”27 
 
Of significance to this article was the call for forensic discipline 
governance.  As expressed in the report’s Executive Summary, 
 
The committee believes that what is needed to support and oversee 
the forensic science community is a new, strong, and independent 
entity that could take on the tasks that would be assigned to it in a 
 
 22  See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 143.  Indeed, the FBI persisted in making such 
statements.  “Mr. Meagher testified that the rate of error for latent fingerprint identifications 
is zero.”  United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 987 (10th Cir. 2009).   
 23  See, e.g., Susan Schmidt & Blaine Harden, U.S. Frees Oregon Lawyer Jailed in 
Madrid Bombings, WASH. POST (MAY 21, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A43732-2004May20.html; Sarah Kershaw & Eric Lichtblau, Bomb Case Against 
Lawyer is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/25/us/bo
mb-case-against-lawyer-is-rejected.html; Sharon Begley, Fingerprint Matches Come Under 
More Fire As Potentially Fallible, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2005), https://www.wsj.com/ar
ticles/SB112864132376462238. 
 24  See Jules Epstein, Preferring the “Wise Man” to Science: The Failure of Courts and 
Non-Litigation Mechanisms to Demand Validity in Forensic Matching Testimony, 20 
WIDENER L. REV. 81, 85 (2014).   
 25  NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 6.   
 26  NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 6.   
 27  NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.   
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manner that is as objective and free of bias as possible—one with 
no ties to the past and with the authority and resources to 
implement a fresh agenda designed to address the problems found 
by the committee and discussed in this report.28 
 
Legislative efforts to create such an institute proved for naught.  2011 
saw the introduction of the Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform 
Act, described by its principal sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy, as intended 
to establish “an Office of Forensic Science in the Office of the Deputy 
Attorney General within the Department of Justice[] . . . [and] a Forensic 
Science Board composed of forensic and academic scientists, prosecutors 
and defense attorneys, and other key stakeholders . . . [with] a majority of its 
members . . . be[ing] scientists.”29 
Leahy’s Bill died in committee.30  Additional efforts in Congress also 
failed.  These were the Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2013 
(Standards Act) and its 2012 predecessor—each “intend[ed] to create a 
national forensic science research program to improve, expand, and 
coordinate Federal research in the forensic sciences.”31  In this vacuum, the 
NCFS was birthed. 
A. The NCFS, 2013–2017 
On February 22, 2013, the Federal Register carried a “Notice of 
Establishment of the National Commission on Forensic Science and 
Solicitation of Applications for Commission Membership.”32  Issued 
pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, members were sought by 
the United States Department of Justice for a Commission to 
 
recommend strategies for enhancing quality assurance in forensic 
science units.  The duties of the Commission will include: (a) 
Recommending priorities for standards development; (b) 
reviewing and recommending endorsement of guidance identified 
or developed by subject-matter experts; (c) developing proposed 
guidance concerning the intersection of forensic science and the 
 
 28  NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 18.   
 29  Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Leahy Proposes Landmark Forensics Reform 
Legislation (Jan. 25, 2011), https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-proposes-landmark-
forensics-reform-legislation.   
 30  Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act, S. 2177, 113th Cong. (2014), 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s2177.   
 31  Jessica D. Gabel, Realizing Reliability in Forensic Science from the Ground Up, 104 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 312–13 (2014) (internal quotations omitted).   
 32  Notice of Establishment of the National Commission on Forensic Science and 
Solicitation of Applications for Commission Membership, 78 Fed. Reg. 12355 (Feb. 22, 
2013), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-02-22/pdf/2013-04140.pdf.   
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courtroom; (d) developing policy recommendations, including a 
uniform code of professional responsibility and minimum 
requirements for training, accreditation and/or certification; and 
(e) identifying and assessing the current and future needs of the 
forensic sciences to strengthen their disciplines and meet growing 
demand.33 
 
The Commission was designed to be a joint effort with the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) with a membership like that 
urged by Senator Leahy for his proposed Forensic Science Board.34  As 
stated, the objective was to achieve “a diversity of experiences, including 
Federal, State, and Local forensic science service providers; research 
scientists and academicians; Federal, State, Local prosecutors, defense 
attorneys and judges; law enforcement; and other relevant stakeholders.”35  
One year later, the Commission was formed36 and held its first meeting.37  
This Article will not track the history of the Commission meeting by 
meeting.  Importantly, the Commission’s membership met the standards set 
by both Senator Leahy and the Federal Register announcement, with pattern 
and impression discipline experts and advocates notably absent, and “hard” 
scientists—from chemistry, physics, and medicine—and a statistician at the 
table.38 
Suffice it to say, the first year was one of some conflict and only modest 
productivity.  As described by NCFS Vice-Chair John Butler in a more 
circumspect fashion, “[w]ith the wide range of experiences among the 
Commissioners (many of whom come from outside the forensic science 
community), time was required in the first few meetings to provide context 
and background information on many of the topics under discussion.”39  In 
 
 33  Id.   
 34  See supra note 30.   
 35  See supra note 30.   
 36  For a full listing of all Committee Members and Ex-Officio Members, see Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Departments of Justice and Commerce Name Experts to 
First-Ever National Commission on Forensic Science (Jan. 10, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-departments-justice-and-commerce-name-experts-first-ev
er-national-commission-forensic.   
 37  U.S. Dep’t of Just., Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci. Meetings: Term 1—Meetings 1–7, 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/term-1-meetings-1-7 (last visited Mar. 2, 2018).   
 38  The decision to exclude forensic discipline practitioners from Commission 
membership, and to instead rely on scientists and statisticians, was—whether intended or 
not—subversive.  It upended a tradition of letting forensic disciplines self-define and instead 
made them subject to scientific scrutiny.   
 39  JOHN M. BUTLER, THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FORENSIC SCIENCE AND THE 
ORGANIZATION OF SCIENTIFIC AREA COMMITTEES 4 (2014), https://strbase.nist.gov/pub
_pres/Butler-ISHI-Proceedings2014.pdf.   
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practice, this meant that time was spent forming subcommittees40 to generate 
work-product for the Commission as a whole to weigh in on.  By way of 
illustration, by the third Commission meeting, the Reporting and Testimony 
Subcommittee divided its focus into five topics and working groups: “(1) 
Report Content; (2) General Issues of Terminology; (3) Probabilistic 
Statements; (4) Problematic or Misleading Terms; and (5) Legal Issues 
Inherent in Reporting.”41 
As to conflict, a fundamental question of definition had to be resolved.  
The Interim Solutions Subcommittee sought to generate a definition, one that 
would be foundational for all Commission work products, of forensic 
discipline analysts or, as the subcommittee described them, “Forensic 
Science Service Providers” (FSSPs)42  Agreement could not be quickly 
reached, with at least one comment focusing on the “[c]oncern . . . that the 
definition does not include the methodology or expectation of science.”43  
Put more simply, putting the term “science” into the definition was a “cart 
before the horse” approach that tacitly accepted many forensic disciplines as 
legitimately scientific.  This was made explicit when the issue was addressed 
at Meeting 4.  As noted in the Meeting Summary, “[o]ne Commissioner 
offered an explanation for abstaining from voting on this item because of the 
word ‘science’ in the definition.  It was further explained that some 
disciplines haven’t demonstrated that they have adequate foundational 
scientific research.  It was suggested to strike the word ‘science.’”44  It was 
not until Meeting 5 that acceptable terminology was identified.45  At Meeting 
6, a definition that at least implicitly acknowledged that not all disciplines 
were scientific was approved.  For the Commission’s work, “forensic 
 
 40  By the second NCFS meeting, six subcommittees were in existence: Accreditation and 
Proficiency Testing; Interim Solutions; Medico-legal Death Investigation; Reporting and 
Testimony; Scientific Inquiry and Research; and Training on Science and Law.  NAT’L 
COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., AGENDA—MAY 12, 2014 2 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/site
s/default/files/ncfs/legacy/2014/05/30/agenda2.pdf.  A seventh subcommittee, that on Human 
Factors, was approved at the second Commission meeting, initially as a subcommittee on 
“cognitive bias.”  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., MEETING SUMMARY MAY 12–13, 2014 
(2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ncfs/legacy/2014/07/29/meeting2-sum
.pdf.   
 41  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., MEETING SUMMARY AUGUST 26–27, 2014 (2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2014/10/16/ncfs_summary_-
_meeting_three_final.pdf.   
 42  Id. at 14–15.   
 43  Id. at 15.   
 44  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., MEETING SUMMARY OCTOBER 28–29, 2014 17 
(2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ncfs/pages/attachments/2015/01/15/ncfs_
meeting_4_summary_final.pdf.   
 45  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., MEETING SUMMARY JANUARY 29–30, 2015 7 
(2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ncfs/pages/attachments/2015/05/04/ncfs-
meeting-5-summary.pdf.   
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science” was “[t]he application of scientific or technical practices to the 
recognition, collection, analysis, and interpretation of evidence for criminal 
and civil law or regulatory issues.”46 
Notwithstanding the year and a half that passed until a foundational 
definition was approved, the Commission went full steam ahead over the 
balance of its existence.  As explained in a “business record” report approved 
by the Commission at its final meeting, 
 
[t]he Commission has adopted 43 work products: 20 
Recommendation documents and 23 Views documents.  
Recommendation documents propose specific requests to the 
Attorney General and describe actions for consideration and 
implementation within the Federal system.  Views documents 
represent the collective views of the Commissioners and do not 
request specific action by the Attorney General.  Views 
documents are designed to comment generally on particular 
subjects and serve as guidance for all forensic and criminal justice 
communities, whether Federal, state, or local.47 
 
Among the Recommendations were the following: 
 
 That all FSSPs be accredited, a recommendation adopted in 
part by the Department of Justice;48 
 
 That FSSPs use a “root cause analysis” to identify causes of 
and offer forward-looking changes after an unusual event or 
severe error, a recommendation endorsed in part;49 
 
 “[T]hat the Attorney General require DOJ FSSPs to develop 
written policies for documenting the examination, testing, and 
interpretation of evidence and for reporting results,” a 
recommendation placed under review but never resolved;50 
 
 46  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION: DEFINING FORENSIC 
SCIENCE AND RELATED TERMS (2015), https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/786571/download. 
 47  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., REFLECTING BACK–LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE 
4 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/952316/download [hereinafter 
REFLECTING BACK].   
 48  Id. at 3, App. C.  The DOJ agreed to require “its non digital DOJ-run forensic labs to 
obtain and maintain accreditation [and for] DOJ prosecutors to use accredited labs to process 
forensic evidence when practicable.”  Id.  The DOJ also stated its intent “to encourage other 
labs around the country to pursue accreditation.”  Id. 
 49  Id. at 5, App. C. 
 50  Id.   
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 That the Attorney General ensure that DOJ employees do not 
use the phrases “to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty” 
or “to a reasonable degree of [discipline] certainty,” a 
recommendation adopted in part;51 and 
 
 That the Attorney General direct federal prosecutors who 
intend to offer forensic expert testimony to provide a detailed 
expert report and allow access to the expert’s case record,52 a 
recommendation adopted in part in a January 2017 directive for 
prosecutors to provide a detailed summary and access to the 
case record.53 
 
One more adopted recommendation that the Department did respond to 
merits special discussion.  The Commission, with much debate and 
collaboration, approved a proposed National Code of Ethics for FSSPs.54  
The proposed Code imposed two particular obligations: 
 
“Once a report is issued and the adjudicative process has 
commenced, communicate fully when requested with the parties 
through their investigators, attorneys, and experts, except when 
instructed that a legal privilege, protective order or law prevents 
disclosure.”55 
 
“Appropriately inform affected recipients (either directly or 
through proper management channels) of all nonconformities or 
breaches of law or professional standards that adversely affect a 
previously issued report or testimony and make reasonable efforts 
to inform all relevant stakeholders, including affected professional 
and legal parties, victim(s) and defendant(s).”56 
 
 
 
 
 51  Id. at 7.   
 52  Id.   
 53  SALLY Q. YATES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT 
PROSECUTORS: DEPARTMENT FORENSIC SCIENCE PERSONNEL (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.justi
ce.gov/ncfs/page/file/930411/download.   
 54  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., RECOMMENDATION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
NATIONAL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR FORENSIC SCIENCE AND FORENSIC 
MEDICINE SERVICE PROVIDERS (2016), https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/839711/download.   
 55  Id. ¶ 15.   
 56  Id. ¶ 16. 
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In adjudicating this Recommendation, the Department limited the 
disclosure duty in the latter provision to providing notice to prosecutors 
rather than all affected parties, and watered down the former by requiring 
discussion with defense counsel “when communications are permitted by 
law and agency practice.”57 
The approval in whole or in part of recommendations was not uniform; 
rather, the Department failed to respond to several others.  These included 
Commission recommendations to: (1) encourage the NIST to establish an in-
house entity “to evaluate the technical merit of test methods and practices 
used in forensic science disciplines;” (2) require all Department FSSPs to 
undergo rigorous proficiency testing and encourage proficiency test vendors 
to share aggregate data with researchers; and (3) require all Department 
FSSPs to “develop written policies for documenting the examination, testing 
and interpretation of evidence and for reporting results.”58 
The Department’s silence on several recommendations was 
exacerbated by the Commission itself at its final meeting in April 2017 when 
it failed to approve two “Views” documents—one addressing with 
specificity and setting minimum content standards for case reports and files59 
and the second supporting the use of statistical statements when reporting 
forensic results “because mathematical analyses provide a useful framework 
for assessing and expressing uncertainty.”60 
The Commission’s “business record” summarized the ample work left 
undone, including to: 
 
 Undertake a survey of law enforcement agencies conducting 
forensic science analysis; 
 
 Develop implementation and enforcement recommendations 
for the uniform code of professional responsibility; 
 
 Provide guidance on evidence preservation and retention; 
 
 
 57  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRACTICE OF 
FORENSIC SCIENCE, in MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENT COMPONENTS (Sept. 6, 
2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/891366/download (emphasis added).  
 58  REFLECTING BACK, supra note 47, at 1, 3, 5, App. C. 
 59  See NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., MEETING #13: APRIL 10–11, 2014 2 (2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/page/file/976566/download; NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., 
VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION: REPORT AND CASE RECORD CONTENTS (2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/page/file/952696/download.   
 60  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION: STATISTICAL 
STATEMENTS IN FORENSIC TESTIMONY (2017), https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/page/file/95246
6/download.   
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 Consider examiner certification: is this feasible, and [whether 
this] should . . . be a requirement for Federal examiners; 
 
 Consider recommendations regarding how to address human 
factors issues in [medical death investigations], especially 
around cases involving child death, in-custody death, and 
police shootings; 
 
 Train forensic science users—law enforcement, lawyers, 
judges, and the public; [and] 
 
 Establish research-based means of effectively and accurately 
communicating forensic science information with the judicial 
system and the public.61 
 
Notwithstanding the list of unfinished work, the Commission left as its 
heritage a body of documents and its presence on the national stage as a voice 
for forensic reform.  This article now turns to assessing the efficacy of that 
presence in two regards.  First, it examines whether there is any measurable 
or potentially attributable impact in the courts; and second, it looks at the 
related issues of “human factors” and cognitive bias to see whether 
appreciation of those issues correlates with their prominence in the 
Commission’s work. 
III. THE NCFS, FORENSIC EVIDENCE, AND THE COURTS: A HISTORY OF 
ABDICATION 
At the most rudimentary level of analysis, from a data-driven 
perspective, the Commission’s work and indeed its existence can be seen as 
having had no relevance to the judiciary.  As of June 4, 2017, only one 
reported decision62 even mentions the Commission’s existence, and even 
then, only noting that an expert witness mentioned the Commission while 
describing his credentials, stating he was invited to serve on one of its 
subcommittees.63 
 
 61  REFLECTING BACK, supra note 47, at 7–9. 
 62  A LEXIS search with the terms “national w/2 commission w/2 forensic” conducted 
June 4, 2017, resulted in only one case result.  See infra note 63. 
 63  State v. Hightower, 511 S.W.3d 454, 458 n.4 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (“Dr. Haber also 
discussed the newly formed National Commission on Forensic Science (‘National 
Commission’).  He explained the National Commission will consist of leading experts in 
various fields of forensic sciences, and it will partner with the National Institute to develop 
uniform standards for scientists in all forensic fields. Dr. Haber testified he has been asked to 
serve on the National Commission committee responsible for developing standards for 
fingerprint analysis.”).   
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The same can be said, at least in terms of relevance to litigation 
outcome, regarding the Commission’s antecedent, the previously-discussed 
NAS Report.64  In the eight-plus years since its release, the Report has been 
mentioned in only 154 court decisions.65  Many of those involve passing 
references66 or discussions of whether the Report, when relied upon in a post-
conviction proceeding, constitutes newly-discovered evidence.67  Most 
importantly, the Report has had minimal impact on the admissibility or scope 
of forensic discipline testimony or the conclusions an expert is permitted to 
present.68  Courts have either let the experts continue their testimony in the 
same form as before the Report was issued69 or “toned it down” in form but 
not in substance, as when an expert would have to testify only that it was his 
or her “opinion” that the fingerprint came from the defendant and no other 
source70 or use the term “reasonable ballistic certainty” rather than 
“reasonable scientific certainty.”71  Strangely, one of the rare cases where the 
 
 64  NAS REPORT, supra note 3.   
 65  A LEXIS search with the terms “strengthening w/3 forensic w/3 science” conducted 
June 4, 2017, produced a list of cases mentioning the report. 
 66  See, e.g., Motorola Inc. v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Easterly, J., 
concurring) (“[I]n assessing the admissibility of forensic expert testimony, courts will have 
the aid of landmark reports that examine the scientific underpinnings of certain forensic 
disciplines routinely admitted under Dyas/Frye, most prominently, the National Research 
Council’s congressionally-mandated 2009 report Strengthening Forensic Science in the 
United States: A Path Forward. . . . .”) (emphasis in original). 
 67  See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 220 So.3d 1133, 1150 (Fla. 2017) (“we have repeatedly 
held that HN12 the 2009 NAS report does not constitute newly discovered evidence”); 
Commonwealth v. Smallwood, 155 A.3d 1054, 1066 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (discussing 
Pennsylvania decisional law to the same effect). 
 68  For a detailed review of judicial rejection of calls to limit forensic testimony in 
response to claims based on the findings in the book STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE: A 
PATH FORWARD, see Epstein, supra note 24, at 105–07. 
 69  See, e.g., United States v. Bonds, No. 15-cr-573-2, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166975, at 
*10 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2017) (citing the report and rejecting a motion to “prevent [the 
examiner] from testifying to a match between the latent print and the suspect print and] instead 
limiting her to describing similarities and differences between the prints . . . .”); State v. Allen, 
No. 2017-KA-0306, slip op. at 14 (La. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2017), https://cases.justia.com
/louisiana/first-circuit-court-of-appeal/2017-2017ka0306.pdf?ts=1509559751 (discussing the 
Report but approving traditional matching testimony because of “the firmly established 
reliability of fingerprint evidence and firearm examination analyses”).   
 70  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 73 N.E.3d 798 (Mass. 2017) (alteration in 
original) (“[t]estimony to the effect that a latent print matches, or is ‘individualized’ to, a 
known print, if it is to be offered, should be presented as an opinion, not a fact, and opinions 
expressing absolute certainty about, or the infallibility of, an ‘individualization’ of a print 
should be avoided.” (quoting Commonwealth v. Gambora, 933 N.E.2d 50, 61 n.22 (Mass. 
2010)).   
 71  Commonwealth v. Heang, 942 N.E.2d 927, 947 (Mass. 2011) (“[W]here an opinion 
matching a particular firearm to recovered projectiles or cartridge casings is limited to a 
‘reasonable degree of ballistic certainty,’ a jury will be assisted in reaching a verdict by having 
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Report was acknowledged as having shown the deficiency of a discipline 
[handwriting comparison], the Report was wielded as a sword against a 
criminal defendant.  When challenging trial counsel’s performance as 
inadequate, the reviewing court concluded that counsel performed capably 
when he cross-examined agents on their failure to conduct any handwriting 
analysis of a relevant document.  The court then added, apparently to indicate 
that the defendant/petitioner actually benefitted from the cross-examination, 
that 
 
[h]andwriting analysis is a form of forensic science that the 
National Research Council has deemed in need of additional 
research to quantify the reliability and replicability of the methods 
employed by document examiners.  Had the government 
performed any type of document analysis, it is likely that the 
results would not have been given much weight in the 
consideration of Petitioner’s arguments.72 
 
This is not to say that no court has tracked the conclusions of the Report 
and applied them.  Two such instances are discussed below.  But before those 
rare, if not anomalous, decisions are analyzed, it is necessary to scrutinize 
the factors that contribute to the failure to seek and then secure application 
of a more stringent screening standard for forensic discipline testimony. 
The first is what can fairly be dubbed scientific illiteracy of lawyers,73 
 
the benefit of the opinion, as well as the information needed to evaluate the limitations of such 
an opinion and the weight it deserves.”).   
 72  United States v. Wallace, No. 00-cr-122, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9708, at *67 n.25 
(D.R.I. Jan. 24, 2017) (citing NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 166–67).   
 73  The term and its application are not new.  David Faigman has written of judges 
deploying “an affirmative illiteracy regarding basic scientific concepts.”  David L. Faigman, 
Admissibility Regimes: The “Opinion Rule” and Other Oddities and Exceptions to Scientific 
Evidence, the Scientific Revolution, and Common Sense, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 699, 718 (2008).  
Two decades earlier, the same epithet was applied.  ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 7 (3d ed. 1986) (footnote omitted) (“[L]awyers as a group 
evidence an appalling degree of scientific illiteracy, which ill equips them to educate and 
guide the bench in its decisions on admissibility of evidence proffered through expert 
witnesses.”).  The concern persists.  Barbara P. Billauer, Daubert Debunked: A History of 
Legal Retrogression and the Need to Reassess “Scientific Admissibility,” 21 SUFFOLK J. 
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1, 2 (2015) (describing “scientific/mathematical illiteracy of the current 
legal community”).  As David Faigman recently summarized, “any blanket statements about 
the scientific illiteracy of the legal profession are inevitably overly broad and many exceptions 
might be found, with Judge Weinstein being an exemplary instance. Nonetheless, the general 
state of affairs with regard to the law’s understanding of the methods of science creates 
substantial obstacles to the coherent use of empirical knowledge gleaned from complex 
research studies.”  David L. Faigman & Claire Lesikar, Organized Common Sense: Some 
Lessons From Judge Jack Weinstein’s Uncommonly Sensible Approach to Expert Evidence, 
64 DEPAUL L. REV. 421, 434 (2015).   
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the source of any motions that would raise challenges to forensic evidence.  
It is not enough to simply quote the conclusions of the NRC that “the 
interpretation of forensic evidence is not infallible [and] . . . [t]his reality is 
not always fully appreciated or accepted by many forensic science 
practitioners, judges, jurors, policymakers, or lawyers and their clients.”74  
That Report continued with the observation that “forensic science evidence 
is not routinely scrutinized pursuant to the standard of reliability enunciated 
in Daubert.”75 
Studies have shown an appalling lack of understanding of Daubert/
Rule 702 terms such as “error rate.”  Judges, when surveyed, have 
acknowledged “that their [scientific] education had left them inadequately 
prepared to serve as gatekeepers under Daubert[;]”76 and on specifics such 
as the scientific concept of “falsifiability,” at best, thirty-five percent of those 
surveyed grasped the essence of the term, while only four to six percent were 
able to clearly articulate the meaning of the term.77 
At even a more fundamental level, judges and practitioners are often 
unaware of the NAS Report, even seven to eight years after its release.  
Confirmation of this is anecdotal, but derived from the experience of this 
author when conducting basic forensic science education at judicial and 
attorney trainings.  Two questions posed to each audience—”How many of 
you have a science background?” and “Have you at least heard of the Report 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE?”—draw a low response rate; for the 
former question, it is typically at a level of fewer than ten percent of the 
audience, while the latter rarely exceeds fifty percent. 
As a consequence of this scientific illiteracy (or unawareness), neither 
the specific work of the Commission nor the message(s) of the Report can 
be found in common motion practice for the average78 attorney.  That there 
are exceptions, with some lawyers using either as a source to challenge 
forensic discipline testimony, is of little solace, as the discussion of the next 
two decisions shows only a rare combination of circumstances brings science 
 
 74  NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 87–88.   
 75  NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 106.   
 76  Edward J. Imwinkelried, Expert Testimony Trends in State Practice and the Uniform 
Rules of Evidence, in OPINION AND EXPERT TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 417 
(2008), https://www.ali-cle.org/doc/courseware/pdf/toc/CN058.pdf.   
 77  Mara L. Merlino & Victoria Springer, Context and Controversy: Why Questions of 
Validity and Reliability Are Seldom Resolved in an Adversarial Setting, 45 TULSA L. REV. 
133, 141 n.29 (2009). 
 78  The designation “average” attorney does not apply to institutional public defender 
offices or lawyers litigating federal death penalty cases.  For the former, targeted and well-
resourced litigation has raised the concerns with forensic discipline testimony, as is best 
illustrated by the work of Washington D.C.’s Public Defender Service, which has litigated 
well-funded and comprehensive challenges.  See, e.g., Pettus v. United States, 37 A.3d 213 
(D.C. 2012) (handwriting challenge).   
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to the fore in cases involving forensic evidence. 
In the first, Almeciga v. Center for Investigative Reporting, Inc.,79 the 
issue was “whether the . . . method of handwriting analysis, as described by 
[the expert], meets the common indicia of admissible scientific expertise as 
set forth in Daubert.”80  The opinion cites to the NAS Report81 and proceeds 
with an exhaustive review, assessing the purported science with strict 
scrutiny of the various Rule 702 and Daubert factors including, inter alia, 
whether the method had been tested,82 had been subjected to meaningful peer 
review,83 had a reasonable error rate,84 had controlling standards within and 
across the field,85 and had general acceptance in the field.86  In each aspect, 
the testimony and its underlying expertise was found wanting.87 
Why is Almeciga then not proof of the impact of the NAS Report and 
therefore, by extension, the work of the Commission?  Beyond it being a 
civil matter, and not a criminal case where forensic evidence is more 
common and the stakes generally higher, the answer is simple—the fortuity 
that the matter was before Federal District Judge Jed Rakoff.  Judge Rakoff 
was an ex officio member of the Commission, and took it upon himself to 
analyze the case through the lens(es) of his experience with the NCFS and 
the lessons of the Report. 
The second case of note, also from 2016, is State v. Romero,88 where 
the Arizona Supreme Court held it was an abuse of discretion to exclude an 
expert who would have contested whether a forensic discipline—firearms 
toolmark analysis—applied scientific methodology.  As the Court explained 
in reversing the lower court’s exclusion, the question was not 
 
whether Dr. Haber was qualified as an expert in firearms 
identification, but instead whether he was qualified in the area of 
his proffered testimony—experimental design. Here, the trial 
court determined that [prosecution expert] Powell was qualified to 
offer an expert opinion that the shell casings were all fired from 
the same Glock.  But Romero did not offer Dr. Haber as an expert 
in firearms identification to challenge whether Powell had 
correctly performed his analysis or formed his opinions.  Instead, 
 
 79  185 F. Supp. 3d 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).   
 80  Id. at 419.   
 81  Id. at 420.   
 82  Id. at 419.   
 83  Id. at 420–21.   
 84  Id. at 421.   
 85  Almeciga, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 422–23.   
 86  Id. at 423–24. 
 87  See id. at 420–24. 
 88  365 P.3d 358 (Ariz. 2016). 
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Dr. Haber’s testimony was proffered to help the jury understand 
how the methods used by firearms examiners in performing 
toolmark analysis differ from the scientific methods generally 
employed in designing experiments.89 
 
This was a holding permitting a “this is not science” expert, itself 
anomalous, as a similar attempt had been rejected in California years 
earlier.90  There, the defense was prevented from calling an expert to explain 
that fingerprint analysis was not a scientific methodology.91  But it is not 
merely the anomaly that confirms the limited impact of the NCFS and the 
predecessor NAS Report.  Romero is a case brought by an institutional public 
defender office; it was before a state Supreme Court that has regularly 
included forensic science issues in its continuing legal education 
curriculum;92 and it actually changed very little.  Romero does not restrict 
the evidence that the prosecution may offer; rather, it permits a defense 
expert to offer testimony urging caution on the reliability of forensic 
discipline, evidence costly to procure and available from a limited number 
of sources.  While undeniably important in acknowledging the existence and 
legitimacy of views critical of the underpinnings of forensic discipline 
testimony, Romero goes but a brief distance in affecting the presentation of 
putative science testimony. 
This discussion cannot end without a review of the United States 
Supreme Court’s treatment of forensic evidence in the years since the NAS 
Report and during and immediately after the lifetime of the Commission.  
The Court has cited to the Report in two decisions, acknowledging its 
existence and some awareness of the limits and risks of forensic discipline 
evidence. 
In the first instance, the Court majority in Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts used the Report to support its determination that forensic lab 
reports were “testimonial” documents that could not be presented without 
the guarantee of the Confrontation Clause—the right to cross-examine the 
analyst.93  Forensic reports and results were viewed with some skepticism. 
 
 89  Id. at 361–62. 
 90  See People v. Gonzalez, No. E052000, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1294, at *9 
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2012).   
 91  Id.   
 92  This author has assisted in planning, and presented at, Arizona judicial education 
programs focused on forensic science issues and, more particularly, the limits of and concerns 
regarding forensic discipline testimony.   
 93  Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009).  The requirement that it 
be the analyst who testifies was later muted by finding that the Confrontation Clause right 
was satisfied if a supervisor of the testing process appeared at trial.  Bullcoming v. New 
Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).  The vitality of either protection has since been 
called into question.  Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).   
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Forensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of 
manipulation. According to a recent study conducted under the 
auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, “[t]he majority of 
[laboratories producing forensic evidence] are administered by 
law enforcement agencies, such as police departments, where the 
laboratory administrator reports to the head of the agency.”  And 
“[b]ecause forensic scientists often are driven in their work by a 
need to answer a particular question related to the issues of a 
particular case, they sometimes face pressure to sacrifice 
appropriate methodology for the sake of expediency.”  A forensic 
analyst responding to a request from a law enforcement official 
may feel pressure—or have an incentive—to alter the evidence in 
a manner favorable to the prosecution.94 
 
This view, however, was not uniform.  The dissent—Justice Kennedy, 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer and Alito—contended 
that the Report was for the legislature and not the courts, as Congress and 
state legislatures “have the power and competence to determine whether 
scientific tests are unreliable and, if so, whether testimony is the proper 
solution to the problem.” 95 
Intriguingly, the second time the Court cited to the Report was in a 
case96  where the challenge was to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing 
to secure a proper expert, a case in which it was ultimately shown that the 
death-sentenced defendant, Anthony Hinton, could not be proved culpable.97 
Hinton was allegedly involved in three robberies, two of which resulted 
in death.  At his trial, the prosecution used ballistics evidence—the fired 
cartridge cases from all three incidents—along with an eyewitness survivor 
of the third crime, to prove Hinton’s guilt, matching the six ballistic items to 
a gun found in his home.  Hinton’s post-conviction challenge was to trial 
counsel’s hiring of an incompetent expert, a choice driven by the lawyer’s 
mistaken understanding of the financial cap imposed on expert services for 
indigent defendants.98 
 
 
 
 
 94  Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).   
 95  Id. at 351 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).   
 96  Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1084 (2014) (citing NAS REPORT, supra note 3).   
        97  Anthony Ray Hinton Exonerated After 30 Years On Death Row, EQUAL JUST. 
INITIATIVE, https://eji.org/anthony-ray-hinton-exonerated-from-alabama-death-row (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2018). 
 98  Hinton, 134 S. Ct. at 1083–85. 
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The Court began by emphasizing that it did not approve of post-hoc 
assessments of the quality of expert witnesses.99  Here, the inquiry was 
different, counsel’s misapprehension of the legal cap on funding, described 
as an “inexcusable mistake of law.”100 
In discussing the prejudice caused by counsel’s error, the Court—this 
time unanimously—repeated the concerns first stated by the Melendez-Diaz 
majority.101  Yet the Court made two statements that show a continued lack 
of understanding of the risk of forensic error.  First, it emphasized that the 
general corrective is not judicial scrutiny of forensic evidence but the 
adversarial response—a competent defense expert against the prosecution’s 
expert witness(es).  To the Court, the “threat” of flawed forensic testimony 
“is minimized when the defense retains a competent expert to counter the 
testimony of the prosecution’s expert witnesses; it is maximized when the 
defense instead fails to understand the resources available to it by law.”102  
This judicial abdication of a supervisory or regulatory function when 
forensic discipline evidence is presented was one problem; the second was 
the Court’s misreading of the NAS Report. 
The Court used the Report as it if were an encyclopedia, citing it to 
explain how a firearms comparison works.  “The theory is that minor 
differences even between guns of the same model will leave discernible 
traces on bullets that are unique enough for an examiner to conclude that the 
recovered bullet was or was not fired from a given weapon.”103  Yet the 
precise section of the Report the Court cited to emphasizes the lack of 
foundational validity of this discipline,104 a point that, while not the focus of 
 
 99  “The selection of an expert witness is a paradigmatic example of the type of ‘strategic 
choic[e]’ that, when made ‘after thorough investigation of [the] law and facts,’ is ‘virtually 
unchallengeable.’”  Id. at 1089 (alterations in original) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)). 
 100  Id. 
 101  Id. at 1090 (“Prosecution experts, of course, can sometimes make mistakes.  Indeed, 
we have recognized the threat to fair criminal trials posed by the potential for incompetent or 
fraudulent prosecution forensics experts, noting that “[s]erious deficiencies have been found 
in the forensic evidence used in criminal trials. . . . One study of cases in which exonerating 
evidence resulted in the overturning of criminal convictions concluded that invalid forensic 
testimony contributed to the convictions in 60% of the cases.”) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 319). 
 102  Id. 
 103  Id. at 1084 (citing NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 150–55). 
 104  NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 153–54 (“But even with more training and experience 
using newer techniques, the decision of the toolmark examiner remains a subjective decision 
based on unarticulated standards and no statistical foundation for estimation of error rates. . . . 
Toolmark and firearms analysis suffers from the same limitations discussed above for 
impression evidence.  Because not enough is known about the variabilities among individual 
tools and guns, we are not able to specify how many points of similarity are necessary for a 
given level of confidence in the result.  Sufficient studies have not been done to understand 
the reliability and repeatability of the methods.  The committee agrees that class 
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the Hinton holding, certainly deserved acknowledgment. 
Yet perhaps the most important “message” regarding forensic 
evidence—and the duty of lawyers to study the evidence before its 
introduction in court—came one year later in Maryland v. Kulbicki.105  On 
its face, Kulbicki posed a simple but provocative question: how is a court to 
judge a lawyer’s time-of-trial effectiveness retrospectively, particularly 
when the representation involved forensic evidence that was later 
discredited?  Kulbicki involved comparative bullet lead analysis—a 
metallurgic comparison of bullets clearly linked to the accused and crime 
scene evidence.106  At the time of trial, the discipline was seemingly reliable 
and not subject to substantial criticism; but a decade later, it was shown to 
have overstated findings.107 
The Court spoke unanimously, and indeed did so without having heard 
oral argument or even received briefing.  In a per curiam opinion, the Court 
explained that “[c]ounsel did not perform deficiently by dedicating their time 
and focus to elements of the defense that did not involve poking 
methodological holes in a then-uncontroversial mode of ballistics 
analysis.”108 
It is in what was not said that the Court diminished the responsibility of 
counsel in a forensic evidence case.  The expert in Kulbicki had authored an 
article four years before trial that contradicted the fundamental precept of his 
trial testimony—that every separate “batch” of metal melted down to 
manufacture bullets had a distinct metallurgic composition.109  Trial counsel 
never uncovered the report.110 
The Court never urged that lawyers consult an expert, read up on the 
discipline, or ask for a curriculum vitae of the expert and then read her or his 
publications.  Rather, the standard was simple—if no one else is questioning 
the discipline, just “go along and ask no questions.”111 
 
 
characteristics are helpful in narrowing the pool of tools that may have left a distinctive mark.  
Individual patterns from manufacture or from wear might, in some cases, be distinctive 
enough to suggest one particular source, but additional studies should be performed to make 
the process of individualization more precise and repeatable.”). 
 105  136 S. Ct. 2 (2015).  For an expanded discussion on Kulbicki and the problems of 
retrospective analysis of criminal convictions after science has evolved, see Epstein, The Role 
of the Courts in Improving Forensic Science: Looking Backwards at Old Cases: When Science 
Moves Forward, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49 (2016). 
 106  Kulbicki, 136 S. Ct. at 3. 
 107  Id. at 4. 
 108  Id. 
 109  Id. at 3–4. 
 110  Id. 
 111  See supra note 97. 
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Kulbicki is easily explained in the context of the Court’s Strickland112 
cases—the presumption is that of effective representation,113 and the 
commitment is to finality.114  And the outcome—reversing the state court’s 
grant of a new trial—is easily defensible on alternative grounds; in particular, 
the lack of prejudice.  But the Court’s omission—the failure to remind 
lawyers of the duty to learn and sometimes question science—is the 
continuation of a disregard of the weaknesses of some forensic discipline 
testimony and a repudiation of any obligation for courts to police that 
problem.  In this regard, the work of the Commission, on its own and as a 
reflection of the concerns of the NAS Report, shows little impact. 
IV. THE NCFS AND “HUMAN FACTORS” CONSIDERATIONS: GENERATING/
EXPANDING THE DISCUSSION 
“Human factors,” put most simply, is the study of “the interaction 
between humans and products, decisions, procedures, workspaces, and the 
overall environment encountered at work and in daily living.”115  Yet, the 
study of how human factors may contribute to error in forensic discipline 
analysis is of relatively recent origin.116  A seminal article raising one aspect 
of human factors in forensic analysis, cognitive bias, and the “observer 
effect,” posited that “[f]orensic science is one of a very few fields that has 
 
 112  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 113  Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.  It is all too 
tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse 
sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved 
unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.  Id. 
at 689. 
 114  Id. at 693–94 (“The standard also reflects the profound importance of finality in 
criminal proceedings.”).  See also Christopher N. Lasch, Redress in State Postconviction 
Proceedings for Ineffective Crimmigration Counsel, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 959, 1012 (2014) 
(analyzing the emphasis on finality for criminal proceedings). 
 115  NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., LATENT PRINT 
EXAMINATION AND HUMAN FACTORS: IMPROVING THE PRACTICE THROUGH A SYSTEMS 
APPROACH vi (2012), http://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=910745 
[hereinafter LATENT PRINTS AND HUMAN FACTORS].  For a comparable definition, see WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., HUMAN FACTORS IN PATIENT SAFETY: REVIEW OF TOPICS AND TOOLS (Apr. 
2009), http://www.who.int/patientsafety/research/methods_measures/human_factors/human
_factors_review.pdf (“Human factors refer to environmental, organisational and job factors, 
and human and individual characteristics which influence behaviour at work in a way which 
can affect health and safety.  A simple way to view human factors is to think about three 
aspects: the job, the individual and the organization and how they impact on people’s health 
and safety-related behaviour.”).   
 116  Itiel E. Dror, Cognitive Neuroscience in Forensic Science: Understanding and 
Utilizing the Human Element, 370 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOCIETY B 1 (2015), 
http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/royptb/370/1674/20140255.full.pdf (“Since 
forensic science emerged about 100 years ago, there has been a systematic neglect in 
considering the role of the human examiner in forensic science. This is despite the fact that 
the human examiner plays a critical role in forensic science.”). 
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not yet profited from this ‘science of science.’  The most obvious danger in 
forensic science is that an examiner’s observations and conclusions will be 
influenced by extraneous, potentially biasing information.”117 
Additional focus on human factors is traceable to the NAS Report.  The 
Report’s Executive Summary concluded that: 
 
[a] body of research is required to establish the limits and 
measures of performance and to address the impact of sources of 
variability and potential bias.  Such research is sorely needed, but 
it seems to be lacking in most of the forensic disciplines that rely 
on subjective assessments of matching characteristics.  These 
disciplines need to develop rigorous protocols to guide these 
subjective interpretations and pursue equally rigorous research 
and evaluation programs.118 
 
The Report thereafter had an extensive discussion of “sources of 
bias,”119 and cited specifically to the research of Professor Itiel Dror 
showing, inter alia, that manipulation of contextual information can cause 
examiners to alter their conclusions.120 
Just prior to the issuance of the Report, the NIST formed an “expert 
working group on human factors in latent print analysis” to conduct “a 
scientific assessment of the effects of human factors on latent print 
analysis.”121  The product, released in 2012, was a 200-plus-page report that 
assessed all aspects of latent print analysis and reporting from a human 
factors perspective, going beyond issues of cognitive bias to workplace 
management and environment and medical assessment of examiners.122  The 
Report urged consideration of measures to reduce the risk of bias, including 
reducing exposure to information that is not domain relevant,123 and urged 
further study of the benefits and costs of implementing blind verification of 
analysts’ conclusions.124  Again, the research of Professor Dror (a member 
of the working group) and others regarding cognitive bias concerns figured 
prominently throughout the report.125 
 
 117  D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in 
Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3, 9 
(2002). 
 118  NAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 8. 
 119  Id. at 122–24. 
 120  Id. 
 121  LATENT PRINTS AND HUMAN FACTORS, supra note 115, at vii. 
 122  Id. 
 123  Id. at 43–44. 
 124  Id. at 185. 
 125  Id.  A search of “Latent Prints and Human Factors” using the term “Dror” resulted in 
EPSTEIN(DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2018  12:04 PM 
2018] IMPACTFUL OR INEFFECTUAL? 765 
Thus, human factors concerns, and in particular, that of “bias,” were 
already being pressed before the creation of the NCFS.  While it cannot be 
proved that the Commission thereafter caused further consideration of 
human factors, it is beyond doubt that the NCFS gave the subject great 
prominence, a prominence that correlates with recognition of its importance 
across the forensic domains. 
By the conclusion of the Commission’s second meeting, human factors 
concerns were clearly of importance: at that meeting, the Commission (and 
thus the public) heard presentations on “Expert Systems and Cognitive 
Bias,”126 “Human Factors and Cognitive Bias in Forensic Science,”127 and 
“The Need For Sequential Unmasking;”128 and a commitment was made to 
form a Human Factors Subcommittee.129  The Commission’s third meeting 
continued the focus, with presentations titled “Human Factors and Forensic 
Science: A Lot of Talk But Not Enough Action”130 and “Minimalizing 
Contextual Bias in Forensic Science.”131  The Human Factors Subcommittee 
was formally designated, and its two chairs appointed.132 
The Human Factors Subcommittee produced both formal and informal 
outcomes.  The three Views documents submitted by the Subcommittee that 
were approved by the Commission called for, respectively: “research . . . to 
assess the performance of forensic science laboratories on routine analytic 
tasks such as comparison of samples to determine whether they have a 
common source;”133 having FSSPs “rely solely on task-relevant information 
when performing forensic analyses . . . [and having] forensic laboratories . . . 
take appropriate steps to avoid exposing analysts to task irrelevant 
information through the use of context management procedures detailed in 
 
38 “hits.”  Other research regarding the risk of biasing and preventive measures appears 
throughout the document.  See, e.g., LATENT PRINTS AND HUMAN FACTORS, supra note 115, 
at 44 n.147. 
 126  MEETING SUMMARY MAY 12–13, 2014, supra note 40. 
 127  DEBORAH A. BOEHM-DAVIS, CAN YOU CONTROL YOUR BIAS? SUBLIMINAL ACTIONS OF 
THE BRAIN THAT CAN AFFECT CASE WORK (2014) https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/f
iles/ncfs/legacy/2014/05/30/boehm-davis-ncfs.pdf.  
 128  D. MICHAEL RISINGER, THE NEED FOR SEQUENTIAL UNMASKING (2014) https://ww
w.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ncfs/legacy/2014/05/30/risinger-sequential-unmasking.pdf.  
 129  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., MAY 12–13 2014 MEETING SUMMARY (2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ncfs/legacy/2014/07/29/meeting2sum.pdf. 
 130  ITIEL E. DROR, HUMAN FACTORS AND FORENSIC SCIENCE: A LOT OF TALK, BUT NOT 
ENOUGH ACTION (2014), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/842526/download.  
 131  WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, MINIMIZING CONTEXTUAL BIAS IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (Aug. 
26, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ncfs/legacy/2014/08/27/thompson-nat-
comm.pdf.  
 132  MEETING SUMMARY AUGUST 26–27, 2014, supra note 41, at 4–5.   
 133  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION: FACILITATING 
RESEARCH ON LABORATORY PERFORMANCE (2016), https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/page/file/90
9311/download.  
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written policies and protocols;”134 and encouraging research on the use of 
checklists as a tool “to ensure the precise performance of repetitive activities 
and avoid bias in all forensic activities.”135 
Human factors issues remain on the national forensics agenda despite 
the Commission’s demise.  The 2016 Justice For All Act amendment 
included “contextual bias” as a proper subject for state expenditures of 
federal funds on “emerging forensic science issues[.]”136  The NIST, having 
formed the Organization of Scientific Area Committees (OSAC) to 
“support[] the development and promulgation of forensic science consensus 
documentary standards and guidelines, determin[e] each forensic 
discipline’s research and measurement standards needs, and ensur[e] that a 
sufficient scientific basis exists for each discipline[,]”137 specifically 
included a “Human Factors” Committee in its structure.138  By February 
2012, that Committee had developed five draft documents for OSAC internal 
use: (1) The Role of the Forensic Examiner; (2) Draft Primer on Cognitive 
Bias; (3) Forensic Science Culture Task Force Document; (4) Draft of 
Internal Guidance Document on Task Relevance; and (5) Ways to Minimize 
Contextual Bias.139 
 
 
 
 
 134  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION: ENSURING THAT 
FORENSIC ANALYSIS IS BASED UPON TASK-RELEVANT INFORMATION (2015), https://www
.justice.gov/ncfs/file/818196/download.  
 135  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION: USE OF CHECKLISTS IN 
FORENSIC SCIENCE (2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/934416/downlo
ad.  
 136  Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016, S. 2577, 114th Cong. (2016), https://www
.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s2577/text.  
 137  Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., NIST Organization of Scientific Area Committees 
Roles and Responsibilities (Apr. 11, 2014), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/document
s/2017/05/09/OSAC-Roles-Responsibilities-Updated.pdf.  
 138  Id. at 4.  The Human Factors Group has extensive responsibilities: (1) it “[p]rovides 
guidance on the influence of systems design on human performance and ways to minimize 
cognitive and confirmation bias and mitigate errors in complex tasks,” including 
“[v]erification procedures (administrative, technical review); [b]linding processes; [and] 
[r]oot cause analysis strategies”; (2) it “[d]evelops case notes templates; (3) it “[d]evelops 
report templates”; (4) it “[p]repares human impact statements for draft standards submitted 
for review, if appropriate, addressing: [l]evel of subjectivity in the decision making, [i]dentify 
tasks that are error magnets, [c]ognitive load, [and] [e]rror identification and mitigation”; (5) 
it “[c]losely reviews standards related to expert testimony”; and (6) it “[w]orks with relevant 
SACs and subcommittees on discipline specific human factors issues (e.g. determining 
domain irrelevant information).” Id.   
 139  ORG. OF SCI. AREA COMMS. (OSAC), ANNUAL REPORT FEBRUARY 2015–FEBRUARY 
2016 36 (2016), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/09/13/osac_annu
al_report_2015-2016.pdf. 
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Professor William Thompson, chair of the OSAC Human Factors 
Committee and a member of the NCFS Human Factors Subcommittee, 
described the impact of the Commission’s work and its continuation under 
the OSAC framework: 
 
The work of our subcommittee has already had substantial impact 
on forensic science. The views document on Ensuring That 
Forensic Analysis is Based Upon Task-Relevant Information is 
the first and only pronouncement from an official body on the 
important issue of the proper basis for forensic science opinions—
that is, what factors a forensic scientist should (and should not) 
consider when performing various analytic tasks.  This question 
had previously been addressed in a few academic publications 
(mainly by Michael Risinger and me), but had never been 
addressed in a serious way by forensic scientists themselves. 
 
The Human Factors Committee of OSAC . . . has been engaging 
the various OSAC subcommittees in discussions of what is task-
relevant and task-irrelevant for various tasks performed within 
each discipline.  These conversations are a necessary starting point 
for discussion of when and whether it makes sense to introduce 
context management procedures (blinding) in order to reduce 
potential bias resulting from exposure to task-irrelevant 
information.  The term “task-relevant,” which was introduced in 
our Commission document, is now widely used within OSAC.  
More importantly, the framework introduced in the document 
(and the accompanying appendix) for distinguishing task-relevant 
from task-irrelevant information appears to have been accepted.  
So it is fair to say that the Commission document established the 
intellectual framework within which subsequent discussions of 
context management have occurred. 
 
Some OSAC subcommittees have accepted the framework 
wholeheartedly and are currently working on lists of task-relevant 
and task-irrelevant information for specific analytic tasks, which 
will be incorporated into standards and guidelines emerging from 
those subcommittees. Others . . . resist performing this analysis on 
grounds that, for them, everything is task-relevant. But even for 
those groups, the analytic distinction introduced in the 
Commission document has taken hold.  The intellectual 
framework introduced in our document is essential for holding 
these high-level and very important discussions.  Without the 
concept of task-relevance (and an authoritative definition of it), 
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there would be no common frame of reference.140 
 
According to Professor Thompson, another NCFS document on 
“performance testing”141 has been influential, leading one forensic science 
center to apply for NIJ funding for “blinded performance testing.”142 
That one forensic science center does not stand alone.  Labs, 
prosecution and police agencies, and forensic science-related organizations 
have planned and presented trainings by Professor Dror on cognitive factors 
in forensic decision-making at least twenty times since 2013 just in the 
United States.143 
Finally, human factors is an agenda item both nationally and 
internationally.  The July 2017 “Forensic Science Error Management 
International Forensics Symposium,” sponsored by the NIST, includes a 
human factors technical track to address “[w]hat is the right balance of 
information necessary for forensic testing and how can unnecessary 
information be sequentially unmasked to prevent subconscious bias[]” and 
will “cover ways to identify and reduce cognitive, contextual, and 
confirmation bias in forensic casework.”144  International forensics 
scholarship is also highlighting cognitive bias concerns, and has 
acknowledged the reports of the NCFS as among those that have “drawn 
unprecedented attention to the need for forensic practitioners to engage with 
cognitive science and human factors.”145  This “unprecedented attention” is 
an indisputable legacy of the NCFS; and although other work of the 
Commission has not impacted judicial reasoning and decision-making, 
concerns about cognitive bias have at least been placed on the “radar” of the 
judiciary.146 
 
 
 140  Email from William C. Thompson, Professor Emeritus, Univ. of Cal., Irvine Sch. of 
Law, to Jules Epstein, Professor of Law & Dir. of Advocacy Programs, Temple Univ. Beasley 
Sch. of Law (Apr. 24, 2017, 14:18 EST) (on file with author). 
 141  See supra note 133. 
 142  Email from Prof. Thompson, supra note 136. 
 143  Email of trainings list from Itiel E. Dror, Professor, Univ. Coll. London, to Jules 
Epstein, Professor of Law & Dir. of Advocacy Programs, Temple Univ. Beasley Sch. of Law 
(Apr. 23, 2017) (on file with author). 
 144  FED. BUS. COUNCIL, INC., FORENSIC SCIENCE ERROR MANAGEMENT: INTERNATIONAL 
FORENSICS SYMPOSIUM AGENDA (2017), https://www.fbcinc.com/e/nistifs/agendarow.aspx.  
 145  Gary Edmond et al., Thinking Forensics: Cognitive Science for Forensic 
Practitioners, 57 SCI. & JUST. J. 144 (2017). 
 146  See, e.g., Itiel E. Dror et al., Cognitive Bias and Its Impact on Expert Witnesses and 
the Court, 54 JUDGES’ J. 8 (2015). 
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CONCLUSION 
What, then, is the measure of the National Commission on Forensic 
Science?  There remain voices supporting its mission and either its 
resurrection or the creation of a similar, science-driven, independent 
advisory body, a call made forcefully by the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, the American Chemical Society, the Federation of 
Associations in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, and the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society in a joint statement.147  Should the NIST be able to 
continue funding the OSAC process, there may be progress on its stated 
goals of working “together to develop and evaluate forensic science 
standards via a transparent, consensus-based process.”148  And in what can 
be described as heartening, at least one prosecutor has publicly bemoaned 
the Commission’s end, noting the need for the NCFS to assist in creating 
guidelines and procedures for rectifying lab errors once they are 
discovered.149  Yet for the OSAC to work, there must be consensus between 
and among practitioners and the scientists and statisticians who are outside 
of the forensic disciplines, an achievement likely only with strong 
encouragement from the Department of Justice or direction from the courts. 
That leadership and direction are currently in question.  This Article has 
documented the judicial abstention from conforming forensic evidence to the 
standards of science.  As of this writing, Attorney General Sessions has yet 
to decide what entity, if any, will replace the Commission, and two projects 
that were undertaken by the Obama Justice Department—”[a]n effort to set 
uniform standards for forensic testimony and . . . a review of FBI testimony 
in several techniques”—remain suspended by the current administration.150 
Beyond that, there remains a substantial gulf between science and what 
is expected of forensic discipline testimony.  In a Pennsylvania capital case, 
 
 147  Letter from the Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Sci. et al. to Jeffrey Sessions, Att’y 
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (June 9, 2017), https://mcmprodaaas.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/Scientific%20Society%20Comment%20on%20DOJ-LA-2017-0006-0001%20-%209
%20June%202017.pdf (commenting in response to Federal Register notice DOJ-LA-2017-
0006-0001 published on April 13, 2017).   
 148  Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., The Organization of Scientific Area Committees for 
Forensic Science (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.nist.gov/topics/forensic-science/organization-
scientific-area-committees-osac (last updated Feb. 16, 2018). 
 149  Rebecca McCray, Jeff Sessions’ Rejection of Science Leaves Local Prosecutors in the 
Dark, SLATE (June 7, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/trials_an
d_error/2017/06/disbanding_the_ncfs_will_lead_to_worse_outcomes.html.  The article 
quotes an Oregon prosecutor as saying that “[t]he [NCFS] was developing guidelines on how 
to retain evidence and on security procedures in crime labs[.] . . . Those would’ve been nice 
to have.”  Id.   
 150  Spencer S. Hsu, Science Organizations Renew Call for Independent U.S. Committee 
on Forensics, WASH. POST (June 29, 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-
safety/science-organizations-renew-call-for-independent-us-committee-on-forensics/2017/0
6/28/3ab8cdea-5b6a-11e7-9b7d-14576dc0f39d_story.html?utm_term=.5b9939d3c518.   
EPSTEIN_FORMATTED.DOCXEPSTEIN(DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2018  12:03 PM 
770 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:743 
a trial court issued a ruling that bitemark evidence shall be admissible at trial, 
relying solely on the lack of novelty of such evidence in its refusal to even 
hold a Frye151 hearing to assess its reliability,152 despite there being near-
uniform rejection of forensic odontology “matching” testimony as invalid 
and without scientific foundation.153  Perhaps more distressing, and further 
ground for pessimism, is the comment of Representative Trey Gowdy at a 
March 2017 committee hearing on the state of forensic science evidence in 
the United States.  Discussing the term “reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty,” Gowdy stated: 
 
There can be no definition for reasonable doubt in Federal Court.  
So, that is a phrase that juries hear, and no judge ever explains 
what it means.  So, why not be able to use the phrase reasonable 
degree of scientific certainty, even though it does not have a great 
explanation or great definition?154 
 
Gowdy, a former federal prosecutor,155 is wrong in his contention that 
jurors are denied a definition of the term “reasonable doubt.”156  Beyond that, 
 
 151  A Frye hearing is used by the Pennsylvania Courts to determine the admissibility of 
expert testimony, utilizing the “general acceptance” standard accounted in Frye v. United 
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).   
 152  Radley Balko, Another Judge Rules in Favor of Bite Mark Evidence, for the Same 
Misguided Reasons, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ne
ws/the-watch/wp/2017/03/16/another-judge-rules-in-favor-of-bite-mark-evidence-for-the-
same-misguided-reasons/?utm_term=.00cd052315df.   
 153  Id.  See also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT: FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF 
FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS (Sept. 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/d
efault/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf.  The Report 
concluded that “PCAST considers the prospects of developing bitemark analysis into a 
scientifically valid method to be low.”  Id. at 87.   
 154  To Examine the State of Forensic Science in the United States: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, & Investigations, 115th Cong. 2:31 
(2017), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/115-8.pdf.  
 155  Trey Growdy, Biography, https://gowdy.house.gov/about/full-biography (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2018).   
 156  By way of example, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals Model Criminal Jury 
Instructions include the following language: “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean 
proof beyond all possible doubt or to a mathematical certainty.  Possible doubts or doubts 
based on conjecture, speculation, or hunch are not reasonable doubts.  A reasonable doubt is 
a fair doubt based on reason, logic, common sense, or experience.  It is a doubt that an ordinary 
reasonable person has after carefully weighing all of the evidence, and is a doubt of the sort 
that would cause him or her to hesitate to act in matters of importance in his or her own life.  
It may arise from the evidence, or from the lack of evidence, or from the nature of the 
evidence.” U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT, MODEL CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 3.06 (Apr. 2015), http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/2012%20Chap
ter%203%20Rev.pdf.   
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asserting that it is proper for a term with no comprehensible meaning to be 
used by testifying experts is directly contrary to the Commission’s goal “to 
promote scientific validity, reduce fragmentation, and improve federal 
coordination of forensic science.”157  Instead, it is evocative of Alice in 
Wonderland158 and antithetical to science.  It is reflective of the Attorney 
General’s focus linking the advancement of forensic science to “help[ing] 
combat the rise in violent crime”159 and not conducive to placing scientific 
validity first. 
 
 
 157  U.S. Dep’t of Just., National Commission on Forensic Science, https://www.justice.
gov/archives/ncfs (last visited Mar. 2, 2018).   
 158  “‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just 
what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’  ‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you 
can make words mean so many different things.’  ‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, 
‘which is to be master—that’s all.’”  LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (1871), 
http://sabian.org/looking_glass6.php.   
 159  See supra note 10.   
